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Introduction
In his contribution to this volume, Alan Durant provides legal scholars with both a
rich understanding of how linguists view terms that are part of the basic argot of
trademark law and a potentially vital explanation of the different social functions that
word marks might serve.1 Both aspects of his analysis introduce the complex variable of
reality into trademark law. Trademark law must decide whether and when to take
account of that complex reality, and what weight to afford such reality, no matter how
enriched an account linguists offer about the actual meaning of signs. In this response, I
suggest that, while trademark law should not become beholden to linguistics, the lessons
of Durant’s linguistic analysis are to some extent already accommodated in the practice
of trademark law, and could be important guides in the further development of a number
of legal principles.
Part I of this Chapter explains why linguistics should matter to trademark law.
Traditionally, and still most typically, words comprise the largest group of trademark
subject matter. Trademark law is structured around protecting the meanings of those
words, at least as understood by consumers, in order (classically) to prevent consumer
confusion. I suggest some reasons why trademark law might ignore the precise reality of
consumer understanding. However, the starting point (if not always the end point) of
trademark law in many contexts is an understanding of how signs actually work in
context, and linguistics is one way of establishing that starting point for words. I explain
how trademark law (despite some superficial departures) does in large part take into
consideration Durant’s observation that legal analysis would comport more with the
reality of how words function if it focused on marks as they are used.
Part II of the Chapter focuses on Durant’s exploration of the concepts of
“distinctiveness” and “descriptiveness”, as understood by lawyers and linguists,
respectively. Durant highlights a divergence between linguistic and legal understandings
of these core parts of trademark terminology. One could attenuate the significance of this
divergence simply by recognizing that the legal usage reflects technical terms of art.
Instead, I argue that Durant’s analysis should reinforce important lessons for legal
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scholars. In particular, it helps us to understand that these terms are, to some extent,
vehicles for more complex policy prescriptions than either exoteric usage or current
technical understandings would suggest. Current trademark law fails adequately to
acknowledge the other-than-supposedly-ordinary meaning of these key parts of
trademark terminology, undermining the transparency of trademark lawmaking.
Finally, in Part III, I argue that particular insights developed by Durant from the
field of linguistics may prove valuable in illuminating several points of contention in
contemporary trademark law. For example, Durant argues that there is less inherent
meaning to words than commonly assumed, even in conjunction with particular goods—a
coupling on which trademark law focuses in deciding whether to recognize trademark
rights without proof of actual distinctiveness. The assessment of this relation, sometimes
described as a test of conceptual strength, nominally determines2 whether a term is
treated as inherently distinctive and hence immediately protectable.3 Instead, Durant
emphasizes that what words mean and what effects they have “depend on how they are
used as much as on the inherent meaning potential of the signs themselves.”
International policymakers increasingly focus on lubricating the system of international
registration, which tends to favor the adoption of marks that are treated as inherently
distinctive. Durant’s work suggests that this is the wrong focus, or at least that we need
to defend the emphasis on trademark registration as pursuing more discrete goals of
economic policy.
Likewise, Durant’s analysis of the different functions of words may be of great
help in the development of the “fair use” or “descriptive, non-trademark use” defense, the
latter of which is becoming one the most contested parts of trademark law in a number of
countries.4 Fair use is one doctrinal setting in which trademark law tries to separate the
protectable and unprotectable meaning that a term might simultaneously carry. Yet,
according to Durant, linguistic theory suggests that it is difficult to separate the
descriptive understandings of a word from its source-identifying character. Instead,
linguistics may offer a number of concepts that can help delineate the types of
2
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permissible uses of a trademark in a more refined fashion than the current legal concepts
of “descriptive use” or non-trademark use.
I. The Limits of Reality: Trademark Law and Linguistic Meaning
A.

Signs Functioning in Principle

Durant argues that the main emphasis in legal studies is on how signs function in
changing markets rather than how signs function in principle. This is surely correct, and
appropriate. Trademark law is at bottom a mercantile law, concerned with actual
marketplace effects. But trademark law has developed rules that on their face purport to
reflect how signs function in principle. For example, it is standard black-letter law that
“descriptive” terms will not immediately operate as source identifiers; trademark law
assumes that consumers will not use such types of signs to identify and distinguish the
goods of one producer from those of another.5 To receive trademark protection for a
descriptive term, a producer must show that the term has acquired a secondary meaning
in the marketplace.6
One might surmise that such rules of law say, or assume, something about how
signs function in principle.7 But it is important to recognize that many of these rules have
been induced over time from the reasoned outcomes in individual cases, where the
outcome to some extent has been informed by how language has been used and
understood in the marketplace. On the whole—and this is an important prudential
consideration, as discussed below—it is probably true that terms that are descriptive fail
immediately to act as source-identifiers in the marketplace.
Moreover, the classification of a term as de iure descriptive, although nominally a
question of fact in a trademark suit,8 might also be understood simply as a legal
conclusion about whether or not a term should immediately be reserved to the exclusive
use of a single producer in the field in question. This broader understanding of the
classification of a term as descriptive is bolstered if one examines some of the ways in
which courts make a determination of whether a term is descriptive or distinctive. For
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example, in Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit identified four considerations that bore on this question: the dictionary
meaning of the term, whether it requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a
conclusion as to the nature of the goods based on the term used, the extent of third party
usage of the term, and whether competitors needed the term in order to compete.
To be sure, the first two factors—dictionary meaning, and the extent of
imagination required to understand the nature of the goods from the term used—appear to
look at inherent meaning. But looking at third party usage of the term, and whether
competitors needed the term in order to compete, allow a court to have regard to the use
of the mark in the marketplace whilst making a nominally conceptual determination. To
be sure, much judicial analysis in this area appears essentially intuitive and unreasoned,
as was the case in Zatarain’s itself, but the legal determination at least appears to proceed
from more than merely an assessment of how the term in question functions in principle.9
Finally, to the extent that rules regarding different types of signs have not been
consolidated into statutory form, but instead operate as a presumption or rule of thumb,
those rules may on occasion give way to empirical reality. Thus, in Peacable Planet v.
Ty, Inc.10 Judge Richard Posner explored the rationales behind another rule that appears
to operate on assumptions about how certain signs function in principle, namely, that
personal names should not be protected as trademarks absent secondary meaning.11
These include the assumption that “some names are so common--such as ‘Smith,’
‘Jones,’ ‘Schwartz,’ ‘Wood,’ and "Jackson"--that consumers will not assume that two
products having the same name therefore have the same source, and so they will not be
confused by their bearing the same name.” (Like the rule on descriptive terms, the
personal name exclusion also reflects economic or competitiveness concerns, namely,
allowing a person to use his own name in his own business and ensuring that owners of
businesses are not prevented from communicating useful information to the consuming
public.)
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However, despite the assumptions about how personal names function in
principle, Judge Posner argued that the scope of a rule is often limited by its rationale and
concluded that in the case before him (NILES for stuffed toy camels), the reality of how
NILES would operate in the marketplace should prevail over routinized application of the
“rule” on personal names. He explained that:
rules of law are rarely as clean and strict as statements of them make them
seem. So varied and unpredictable are the circumstances in which they are
applied that more often than not the summary statement of a rule—the
terse formula that judges employ as a necessary shorthand to prevent
judicial opinions from turning into treatises—is better regarded as a
generalization than as the premise of a syllogism. The "rule" that personal
names are not protected as trademarks until they acquire secondary
meaning is a generalization, and its application is to be guided by the
purposes that we have extracted from the case law. When none of the
purposes that animate the "personal name" rule is present, and application
of the "rule" would impede rather than promote competition and consumer
welfare, an exception should be recognized. And will be; for we find cases
holding, very sensibly--and with inescapable implications for the present
case--that the "rule" does not apply if the public is unlikely to understand
the personal name as a personal name.
Thus, even where trademark law may seem to adopt rules reflecting beliefs about how
signs function in principle, the derivation of such rules, their practical implementation,
and their interpreted scope often allow legal analysis to reflect marketplace realities. As
a result, much of trademark doctrine fits quite well with Durant’s linguistic conclusion
that, both as regards eligibility for protection and enforcement of rights, the meaning of
signs should be judged on the basis of criteria concerning the use of the signs in a given
context.12
B.

Departures from Reality or More Complex Reality

On occasion, however, trademark law departs from Durant’s principle, and
ignores the precise social reality of consumer understanding of words as used. In this
section, I suggest some of the reasons why trademark law might do so, and discuss what
those departures from reality might mean for the relevance of linguistics to trademark
law.
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1.

Competing Goals

Trademark law may seek to pursue prescriptive goals that over-ride protecting the
sanctity of actual consumer understanding. For example, most trademark laws permit
third parties to make unauthorized use of a protected term otherwise than as a mark, in
order fairly and in good faith to describe the qualities or characteristics of the goods of
that third party.13 In a recent case, KP Permanent v. Lasting Impressions,14 the United
States Supreme Court recognized that the policy objectives underlying the so-called
classic fair use defense might on occasion trump the classic concern of trademark law
with avoiding a likelihood of confusion. That is, the competitive gains that flow from
enabling rival producers to make use of essential descriptive terms may exceed the
reduction in search costs that would be achieved by prohibiting the competitors’
somewhat confusing use. Likewise, the greater latitude sometimes afforded those who
make unauthorized use of a trademark for parodic purposes might simply reflect a
concern for free speech values that is more fundamental than solicitude for the integrity
of consumer understanding.15
In some instances, these competing considerations appear incommensurable,
requiring courts confronted with infringement claims to muddle through, trying best as
they can to optimize competing social objectives. For example, in 1938 the United States
Supreme Court held that rivals of the original producer of SHREDDED WHEAT pillowshaped biscuits were entitled to use that term (which the Court deemed generic) in part
because of competition considerations and concerns attendant to the integrity of the
patent system.16 But the Court also required the rivals to use the term in ways that paid
due regard to whatever consumer association of the term with the original producer in
fact remained.
On other occasions, the limit on trademark rights can be explained as fully
concordant with the affirmative purposes of trademark law. For example, one can
13
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reconceptualize the parody defense, if such an autonomous defense exists, as recognition
of the relatively small likelihood that a parody use of a mark would cause confusion on
the part of consumers.17 Similarly, some scholars have aligned the fair use defense with
the core objectives of trademark law by arguing that a non-trademark use will not cause
confusion in the first place.18 Indeed, even if the objectives are truly competing—such as
free speech and avoidance of consumer confusion in some instance—it might be
inaccurate to characterize these additional objectives as departures from linguistic reality.
To be sure, they represent a reduction in the solicitude typically shown by trademark law
to the preservation of one marketplace function of words, namely, to identify source. But
one might equally regard the decision of trademark law to temper its regard for the
source-identification function of the word in question as respect for a more complex
reality, namely, that the word is also serving other (associative or communicative)
functions that also warrant respect.
Thus, one could view these additional considerations as competing or
complementary; one could regard the tempering of protection for actual consumer
association as either a sign that trademark law is unconcerned with that reality, or that
trademark law is paying due regard to the multiple functions that the term is serving.
Historically, as a matter of trademark practice, linguistic understandings have been used
most directly within the rubrics of consumer association and consumer confusion, such
that decisions to derogate from full protection of the source-identifying function are not
always evident. But as the multiple uses of trademarks become better understood, and
perhaps as those other uses become more economically significant, linguistics may
provide the tools to help us better incorporate competing functions that words are in fact
serving.19 Realities matter under either explanation; thus, as regards the protection of
word marks, so do the insights that linguistics may have to offer.
2.

Efficiency Calculations

Alternatively, efficiency calculations common to operation of administrative or
judicial schemes may suggest that the law operate with a less calibrated view of reality.20
The costs incurred in order for administrative and judicial institutions to make finelygrained, accurate assessments of consumer understanding, might surpass the social gains
that such accurate assessments would capture.
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Those costs consist in part of the expense involved in adjudicating questions of
consumer understanding. In order to contest the issue of secondary meaning, for
example, litigants are likely to commission costly surveys of consumer understanding of
words. The same is true of the primary enforcement question in trademark litigation,
namely, the likelihood of consumer confusion. Although courts have been careful to deny
that these studies are required in order to make out a trademark case, the existence of a
survey is extremely strong evidence on both issues. Indeed, black-letter law in the United
States suggests that the absence of a study demonstrating confusion would badly hamper
a trademark infringement claim.21
If trademark law required courts to make assessments of understandings of words
that varied from one group of consumers to another, as detailed linguistic analysis might
enable it to do, the costs of litigating infringement suits would become prohibitive.
Likewise, if in reflection of such detailed studies of marketplace reality, courts imposed
relief requiring producers to use marks differently across different groups of consumers,
the costs of doing business would skyrocket. Thus, on the whole, trademark law deals
with a rough reality. Classic trademark infringement analysis enjoins third party uses that
would confuse an “appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers.”22 Indeed, that
purchaser is in large part a legal fiction that implements a vision of the degree of
consumer protection regulation that Congress and the courts think appropriate without
rendering commerce inefficient.
To be sure, at some relatively high level of generality, trademark law might tailor
relief to the realities of a more refined marketplace analysis. Thus, courts have
recognized terms as generic in the consumer retail market but acting as a source-identifier
in the wholesale market.23 And the territorial scope of trademark rights means that courts
might offer relief in one part of the country (or one country) and not another. But, on the
whole, considerations of efficiency require that trademark law make less semanticallyprecise judgments about the function of words than linguistics might be able to venture.
That said, the starting point of trademark law is an understanding of how words
(or other signs) actually work in context. If we can neither prove nor predict that a term
will act as a source-identifier for consumers, there is no reason for trademark law to be in
play. Linguistics is thus (along with other disciplines, such as marketing or cognitive
psychology) one way of establishing the starting point. Indeed, to make calculations
about whether the costs of ascertaining precise pictures of reality outweigh the gains of
21
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at 1640-42.
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efficient, rougher justice, one needs to know more about how linguists would find the
answer and what form (e.g., how certain, how nuanced, how helpful) that answer would
take.
II. Linguistics Reinforcing Lessons for Legal Scholars
The notions of descriptiveness and distinctiveness are both crucial to trademark
law. As suggested above, the terms have become legal terms of art. But both terms are
words in everyday use. Durant persuasively demonstrates that the terms “descriptive”
and “distinctive” can carry a number of quite different meanings when used in their in
ordinary everyday senses. In particular, both words could imply either value-neutral and
value-laden understandings; trademark law, on the whole, would purport not to be
making any value judgment about the term for which protection is sought, other than that
it serves a particular function.
As Durant acknowledges, this might all mean nothing. After all, one can simply
treat the legal understandings as terms of art quite apart from everyday understandings
about which linguistics can inform. However, the divergence between common and legal
understandings of terms such as “descriptive” and “distinctive” is important because
trademark law (through its use of terms that do not obviously seem to be terms of art, and
its superficially simple consumer protection rationale) is often thought to be quite
intuitive. Copyright and patent law are far less intuitive and to the extent that they use
key phrases that might seem to be capable of common-sense interpretation the more
extensive statutory definitions make clearer that these concepts are terms of art
implementing a range of prescriptive choices.24
Showing the different understandings of terms such as “descriptive” is important
precisely because it highlights that these are, to some extent, terms of art carrying more
than a common meaning (if there is such a thing). In particular, courts often define the
concept of distinctiveness in what might simply be described as “reactive” terms: courts
are merely measuring what understanding exists, as one everyday meaning of the term
“descriptive” would suggest. Of course, as noted above, much more is going on when a
court labels a term “descriptive,” and that determination reflects a number of prescriptive
policy choices. Highlighting that even the everyday use of the term “descriptive” is not
necessarily value-neutral helps to reinforce a lesson that trademark law badly needs to
take on board.25
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Moreover, trademark law often resorts to repositories of common understanding, such as
dictionaries, to inform its application and interpretation of the legal term of art. For application, see
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by everyday linguistic understandings of that term. Of course, perhaps the textualist philosophy of the
current Supreme Court may make this concern more acute in a number of areas.
25
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III. Linguistics Informing the Further Development of Trademark Thought
A.

The Role of Registration Systems

One of the lessons that linguistics could teach lawyers and which is developed in
Durant’s paper is that there is less inherent meaning to words than commonly assumed by
trademark law, even when coupled with goods or services. Context of use is required to
get a grasp on meaning. As Durant neatly puts it, “the combination of signifier and
signified as conventional semiotic sign, for trademarks as for all signs, significantly
underdetermines use.” Trademark law does of course already give great weight to
context. But perhaps there are still lessons to be learned from heeding Durant’s
admonition that the functioning of trademarks should be seen as form of “language in
use.”
For example, this observation might suggest that the tort-based passing off model
of preventing consumer confusion is more likely closely to mesh with real consumer
understanding, with any analysis of consumer understanding at registration prior to use
being too speculative to be useful. A broad reading of Durant’s conclusion might
question the wisdom of a registration system. A narrow, and better, reading might simply
conclude that Durant’s observation emphasizes the need to understand the development
of registration systems as a function of other social and economic objectives.26
Taking that lesson forward, international lawmakers increasingly focus on
lubricating the system of international registration, which tends to favor the adoption and
protection of marks that are claimed to be inherently distinctive. (Registration is needed
to take advantage of the international protection systems, with the exception of the
protection of well-known marks). But debates about the wisdom of registration systems
should perhaps be conducted with candid reference to broader economic policy rather
than under cover of enhanced protection of consumer understanding.
B.

Permissible Uses

Another area of trademark law where linguistics may offer insights is with respect
to permissible uses. Unlike copyright law, trademark law has historically included very
few affirmative defenses. Most permissible uses could be justified because they did not
create likely confusion, or (in countries such as the United Kingdom) were not uses in the
course of trade. Yet, explicit development of permissible uses is a topic that is beginning
to command the attention of courts and legal scholars. And it is likely to continue to do
so given expansion in trademark subject matter, broader interpretation of the types of
actionable confusion, and the widespread adoption of dilution law. In short, as trademark
rights get stronger, the clamor for defenses to permit the continuation of behavior
previously outside the scope of trademark law will become greater.

26

See Lionel Bently, The Making of Modern Trade Marks Law: The Construction of the Legal
Concept of a Trade Mark (1860-80) in TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE
(Lionel Bently, Jennifer Davis & Jane Ginsburg, eds. 2007).
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New business models will also make certain referential uses of marks more
significant. Increasingly—and this is especially true online—many innovators are seeking
to generate profits not by asserting rights in the primary content that they generate and
distribute, but by offering content free and instead building business models around the
provision of complementary or affiliated goods and services. Complementary products
and services will be one of the keys in the economy of the next few years. The ability of
competitors to make reference to the mark affixed to primary products and thus to
compete in those complementary and service markets will depend upon whether the
scope of trademark rights will extend to preclude even very loose senses of affiliation that
consumers might develop between the respective goods. But it will also depend on
whether trademark law will directly and expressly privilege certain uses that enable
competition in those complementary markets.
Moreover, as so much of online activity comes to be framed by the use of search
engines that use trademarks rather than content to structure targeted advertising, the
regulation of such practices will shape consumer shopping habits and the availability of
information about complementary products. It is in this context, in particular, that the
purported trademark use requirement (or non-trademark use defense) is being most
heavily litigated.
Again, Durant’s analysis offers interesting lessons for legal scholars. The
function that producers and consumers want marks to serve has changed. The mark
VIRGIN applied to a telephone may tell consumers that the phone manufacturer in
question is striving to appeal to, and values, hip, young tech-savvy consumers. It might
also say to other members of the public that the person using the VIRGIN phone is a hip
young tech-savvy consumer (even if he is not). Neither function is a classic naming
function (as linguists would understand it). But the consumer understanding that has
been engendered and that has been embodied in the term VIRGIN clearly comports with
what some would call the “modern” notion of a mark, which is moving closer to what the
marketing literature would call “brands”.
This evolution might, as Barton Beebe suggests, have come about as a result of
the practice of using marks as properties in and of themselves detached from any goods
in particular.27 But it might also reflect that consumers no longer value information
about the source of goods or even about the physical characteristics or quality of the
goods, for which the name of the source vouches. Instead, consumers crave the emotive
or associative understandings with which the mark has become imbued. Consumers want
to buy “cool NIKE shoes”, not “sturdy NIKE shoes”, let alone “NIKE shoes made by
Nike, Inc.” (Sometimes, “sturdy” and “made by Nike, Inc.” can be cool, of course, so
these are not bright lines).
Durant astutely observes that, despite the attractions of securing a legally strong
mark by adopting a term that is wholly arbitrary or coined, producers have a tendency to
select marks at the margin of descriptiveness. They do so because they would like to
appropriate not only the source-identifying capacity of the term, but any evocative power
27

See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 704 (2004).
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that the term might also provide. And, Durant explains, this is best achieved by selecting
a mark close to the line between descriptive and suggestive marks. He analogizes the
operation of such marks to the “abbreviated description” that Bertrand Russell thought
may be active in the case of proper names, “which only denote because of a cluster of
descriptions of the bearer activated in the mind, for which the name acts as a kind of
shorthand.” As a result, Durant concludes that, when those marks are protected,
“protection granted to acquired meaning will encroach into descriptive properties of a
sign in which there is a legitimate public interest, as an ‘intellectual common’, unless
clear boundaries govern precisely what ‘trade mark use’ (as opposed to more general,
public use of protected verbal signs) will be.”
Some might propose, as a result, that descriptive terms should never be protected
by trademark law.28 Others might bemoan the strong reading given to the notion of
incontestability in U.S. law.29 What trademark law has in fact done, in different ways, is
to begin to strengthen defenses to claims of infringement. Indeed, Durant’s conclusion
about the operation of marks protected on the basis of secondary meaning supports the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in KP Permanent that the fair use defense
must encompass uses where some confusion is likely.30

28

See Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095
(2003) (arguing that the First Amendment prohibits protection or registration of descriptive terms).
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See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 201 (1985).
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There is no identical fair use defense as such in EU law. To some extent, any requirement that a
plaintiff must allege that a defendant has made a “trademark use” of the plaintiff’s mark in order to mark
out a trademark infringement claim under the Trademark Directive might result in similar outcomes.
However, it is not clear that the Trademark Directive mandates that the defendant make a trademark use.
See Case C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Budejovicky Budvar, [2004] E.C.R. I-10989 (ECJ 2004)
(EU); Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club Plc v. Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10273 (ECJ 2002) (EU); Case C2/00, Holterhoff v. Freiesleben, [2002] E.C.R. I-4187 (ECJ 2002) (EU). In its most recent judgment, the
European Court of Justice did not squarely address the argument that infringement depended on a
trademark use and held instead that there is a prima facie case of infringement if the defendant’s use
“affects or is liable to affect the functions of [the plaintiff’s] trademark.” See Case C48/05, Adam Opel v.
Autec AG, (ECJ 2007) (EU), 2007 WL 187793, at ¶¶ 22–25. But to the extent that this does state a
trademark use requirement, the Court effectively subsumed the trademark use analysis within the broader
question of confusion (or antecedent notions of consumer association) by holding that the answer to that
question depend upon whether “the relevant consumer perceive[d] the sign identical to the [plaintiff’s] logo
appearing on the [defendant’s products] . . . as an indication that those products come from . . . [plaintiff] or
an undertaking economically linked to it.” As a result, the European Court appears less willing to sanction
permissible uses that cause confusion. Of course, even confusion determinations themselves reflect policy
choices regarding permissible levels of confusion. See Dinwoodie, supra note 25; Davis, supra note 21. If
the European courts were willing to acknowledge that reality, then EU law could approximate the position
reached by U.S. law in KP Permanent under the rubric of actionable confusion. Alternatively, the
European Court could develop a more vibrant version of the defense based on the defendant’s use of the
mark in accordance with honest commercial practices. See Trademark Directive, supra note 5, art. 6. But,
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The justification for the fair use defense can easily be expressed in the vernacular
of law and economics, the dominant contemporary rationale for U.S. trademark
protection: use by a third party of the non-source-identifying (descriptive) aspects of a
mark will not increase consumer search costs because such use will not interfere with the
mark’s source-identifying capacity.31 Thus, the fair use defense is intended to ensure that
the trademark owner obtains protection not for the word in gross, but only for the sourceidentifying aspect of the term. This argument operates on the proposition that trademark
law is able to separate the source-identifying aspects of the term from the other aspects of
the term. However, while Durant appears to endorse this overall view, he nevertheless
queries how easily the different aspects of the term can effectively be separated. It might
thus be better to acknowledge, as the Supreme Court implicitly did in KP Permanent, that
“descriptive uses” of trademarks by third parties might be interfere with consumer
understandings of the term as a mark, but that such uses are still warranted for the
competitive benefits they secure in light of the minimal confusion they cause.32
Durant’s conclusion about the inevitable intermingling of a word’s descriptive
and naming capacities suggests that the goal of ensuring continued public and competitor
access to the functions of a term that do not implicate the legitimate purposes of
trademark protection will have to be pursued aggressively. The most aggressive efforts
to guarantee these permissible uses have taken the form in several countries of the
argument that only a defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark “as a trademark” can give
rise to prima facie liability.33 Alternatively, some courts have begun to question whether
certain forms of confusion currently giving rise to liability should be actionable.34
Affording greater scope to affirmative defenses (such as fair use) will also be
potentially important.35 This may involve courts articulating more clearly the types of
31
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Ltd. v. BMW (AG), [2007] SCA 53 (Republic of South Africa, Court of Appeal, May 17, 2007); Case
C48/05, Adam Opel v. Autec AG, (ECJ 2007) (EU), 2007 WL 187793; (TA) 506/06 Matim Li v. Crazy
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http://www.bailii.org/databases.html#scot. Whether a trademark use is required as an element of an
infringement case is far from settled. See generally Dinwoodie and Janis, Confusion Over Use, supra note
4 (discussing US and EU law).
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third party uses that should be permitted, either because they only marginally implicate
trademark interests or because they substantially affect other important communicative
interests. Durant stresses that determining whether a defendant’s use has evoked the
source-identifying aspect of plaintiff’s mark, as opposed to the descriptive properties of
that term, can only be done by analyzing the “discourse ‘setting’ in which interpretations
are constructed.” He concludes that this involves more than examining the relationship
between the sign and the plaintiff’s goods; analyzing descriptive “uses” is a more
complex assessment than a descriptive “term.” More particularly, Durant suggests that
attention must be paid to:
dimensions of communication that have received some attention in trade
mark law but are arguably less clearly articulated than the sign’s semiotic
properties. These communicative dimensions include: what genre the trade
mark is embedded in (e.g. conventional editorial, such as a news story;
name or slogan of an advert; text used in labelling, etc); the level and type
of cultural knowledge assumed on the part of the average consumer, as
addressee (assumptions about commerce and communication, as well as
general-knowledge assumptions that sponsor interpretive inferences); and
the adopted mode of address (how the addressee is invited to view the
discourse, including who to assume is its author or speaker-persona).
How signs work in a given context of use also depends on intention and
attribution of intention, as well as on the receiver's interpretive strategy.
Enforcement must accordingly be similarly concerned with such aspects
of use, if use considerations are not to be some sort of return of the
repressed in relation to the semiotic framework that underpins trade mark
law.
That is to say, the type of use will be relevant to infringement, but it must be a highly
contextualized analysis of use type.
The trademark use requirement—one popular doctrinal candidate for ensuring
socially useful third party uses—would deny such analysis, making the entire question
(for other reasons, such as the belief that the rule would bring certainty) turn on whether
the defendant used the plaintiff’s mark “as a mark”. For reasons that I have written about
at length elsewhere, this is at once too blunt and too uncertain, given contested notions of
what is a mark.36 Resolving the extent of permissible uses within the rubric of confusion
would offer such context, but current modes of analysis might be inadequate absent
adaptation to guarantee permissible uses in the fashion thought necessary, because courts
are often to reluctant to acknowledge the prescriptive choices bundled up in confusion
analysis.37
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This leaves the descriptive fair use defense.38 At present, despite the opening
provided by the United States Supreme Court in KP Permanent, courts have offered a
very narrow reading of the defense.39 Trademark lawyers have very little real
understanding of what is a “descriptive use” because the issue has in the past been rarely
litigated. Durant offers us a linguistic analysis that again might prove extremely useful.
He explains that:
The frequency and significance of the word ‘describe’ in ‘non-trade mark
use’ or ‘fair use’ defences is notable. This is despite the oddity of the
word ‘describe’ in this context, since it can hardly be to do with specific
properties of the goods. More likely in this context is one of the other
senses of ‘describe’ and ‘descriptive’ outlined above: that of asserting
something that may be true or false, or in some other way commenting
rather than naming. The defendant’s use of the plaintiff's mark is said to
‘describe’ the plaintiff's product or to ‘describe’ their own product, rather
than being an infringing use. This is a sense closer to ‘general
communicative use’, and contrasts with specifically ‘naming’ use.
This is a much broader reading of the term “descriptive” than courts have offered,
purporting to read fair use defenses quite literally. But, as Durant stresses, the term
“descriptive” is an odd choice. That ambiguity allows rooms for the type of broad
interpretation that Durant advances, building also on our earlier observation about the
complex linguistic understanding of the term in the context of establishing rights.40
Indeed, Durant concludes with discussion of linguistic classification that might
provide focus to the more general approach suggested above. In particular, the divide in
linguistics between “use” and “mention” or “reference” might be really helpful as we
begin to develop an understanding of the types of use that should be permitted; our
current legal vocabulary is very unhelpful. Interpreting the successful arguments of the
defendant in The Joy of Six case, Durant suggests that:
‘The Joy of Six’ was viewed as being, in effect, a kind of quotation, the
sort of echoic effect that a linguist might classify as ‘mention’ (or
‘interpretive use’) rather than mainstream ‘use’.
What distinguishes
‘mention’ from ‘use’ in linguistics is that, in mention (or interpretive use),
the speaker utters something as if with inverted commas round it, or
quotes specific wording or seems to attribute chosen words to another
38
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voice. In doing so, the speaker seems to stand aside from the utterance,
disclaiming or distancing herself from rather than affirming or certifying
in propria persona what is said
This concept may be valuable because the concept of mention subsumes a number of
ordinary everyday conversational uses of marks that we assume to properly be outside the
the control of trademark owners, as well as parodic uses that have been vindicated in
prior case law.
Conclusion
Linguistics has a lot to teach trademark law. It is surely a discipline relevant to
the practice of trademark law. But, perhaps more importantly, linguistic understanding of
key terms of art in trademark law illustrates the inevitable prescriptive content of
supposedly descriptive assessments of trademark claims. And concepts that linguists
have developed to classify and explain the use of language may prove helpful in
providing a framework in which trademark law can grapple with developing rules that
address the multiple functions that trademarks now serve.
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